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Abstract
Longevity increases and population ageing create challenges for all societal
institutions, particularly those providing retirement income, healthcare, and long-
term care services. At the individual level, an obvious question is how to ensure all
retirees have an adequate, secure, stable, and predictable lifelong income stream
that will allow them to maintain a target standard of living for, however, long the
individual lives. In this chapter, we review and discuss the main pension
decumulation options by explicitly modelling consumers’ behaviour and objectives
though an objective function based on utility theory accounting for consumption
and bequest motives and different risk preferences. Using a Monte-Carlo simulation
approach calibrated to US financial market and mortality data, our results suggest
that purchasing a capped participating longevity-linked life annuity at retirement
including embedded longevity and financial options that allow the annuity provider
to periodically revise annuity payments if observed survivorship and portfolio out-
comes deviate from expected (or guaranteed) values at contract initiation deliver
superior welfare results when compared with classical annuitization and
non-annuitization decumulation strategies.
Keywords: retirement planning, pensions decumulation, longevity-linked
life annuity, risk-sharing, income drawdown, financial advice
1. Introduction
Longevity increases and population ageing create challenges for all societal
institutions, particularly those providing retirement income, healthcare, and long-
term care services. Empirical results show that longevity improvements are not
homogeneous across all socioeconomic groups (see, e.g., [1–4]). At the individual
level, an obvious question is how to ensure all retirees have an adequate, secure,
stable, and predictable lifelong income stream that will allow them to maintain a
target standard of living for, however, long the individual lives. The answer to this
question is not linear and depends on several factors such as the role of occupa-
tional/personal pensions, defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC)
nature, minimum income guarantees, social networks (e.g., family structure and
interconnectedness, informal care networks), institutional and government regula-
tions and interventions (e.g., on the design of the pension system architecture, on
the mandatory or optional nature of contributions, on auto- enrolment, on labour
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income and pensions taxation), on individual preferences (e.g., regarding continu-
ing to work after retirement, bequest, lifecycle planning), and family background
and family shocks (e.g., inheritances, divorce) that prevent accumulation or accel-
erate decumulation, financial system development (e.g., the existence of efficient
capital and insurance markets), or the risks involved in the generation of retirement
income (e.g., investment, inflation, contribution, political, longevity, liquidity,
behavioural). This also depends on general policy goals and constraints on fiscal
policy, old-age poverty, tax neutrality over the life cycle, redistribution objectives,
intergenerational fairness, or the political economy of an ageing society.
Planning for retirement requires workers to clearly understand their age-specific
needs, vulnerabilities, and preferences at old age, which are certainly not the same
during working life. The likelihood of experience disrupting life events such as
experiencing changes in physical and mental health that anticipate retirement or
generate some impairment, losing a partner that contributed to the households
regular budget, caring for a spouse or other family members, changing housing,
changing jobs and starting a new career at old age must be part of the retirement
planning equation. Individuals must fully understand their financial goals, the
expected income (and services) sources they anticipate in the accumulation and
decumulating phases and be aware of the risks they are willing to take and the ones
they want to insure, diversify, or hedge. Typical old-age financial needs include
having a minimum guaranteed income stream that smoothens the transition from
working life to retirement and protects from the eroding effect of inflation on the
purchasing power of money, having an extra income to guarantee access to health-
care and long-term care services (medicines, dental care, care at home, nursing
home care), bequeathing (cash inheritance, housing wealth, grandchildren’s educa-
tion, funeral expenses, donations), or paying for life style activities (e.g., travel-
ling). To fund for longer lives, people will ultimately rely on a retirement wallet
combining state, employer-based or personal pensions, social institutions, family,
own savings (including housing wealth), continued labour income, and insurance
sources, with weights determined by both personal and institutional circumstances
[5, 6].
The role of funded individual retirement provisions has increased over recent
decades, as a result of systemic reforms of public pension schemes (move from
NDB schemes towards FDC schemes, introduction of private savings pillars, for
example, in Sweden, Poland), the decreasing public generosity of public annuities
as a result of fiscally driven public pension reforms (e.g., Portugal, Spain), policies
encouraging voluntary supplementary saving and disbursement via life annuity
(e.g., Australia and New Zealand), private schemes switching from existing FDB
schemes to FDC, and the “Pension freedoms” reform introduced in the UK in April
2015 providing greater flexibility and choice over how to access their defined
contribution (DC) pension pots [7, 8]. The way individuals chose to decumulate
their assets is one of the most important decisions they will make as they approach
and enter into retirement. The decumulation process involves in some cases a one-
off decision, made at the time of retirement (e.g., when an individual uses his entire
wealth to pay the single premium of a standard life annuity or of a longevity-linked
life annuity), but quite often involves a sequence of ad-hoc or programmed deci-
sions spanned throughout the whole retirement period (e.g., when individuals opt
to manage their assets and follow some simple or more complex drawdown rules, or
when they simply choose not to divest and continue to accumulate savings).
The decumulation strategy may include investment, inflation, longevity, and
other biometric risk guarantees, but often requires the individual to decide upon
how much to withdrawn periodically from the pension pot to live on, particularly
when public or private pension scheme benefits are not enough to pay regular
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expenses, considering the remaining lifetime, and deciding on how to allocate the
remaining funds during retirement [9]. Traditional disbursement product options
include level (nominal or real) life annuity contracts, programmed drawdown
schemes and lump sum payments, and several hybrid risk-sharing solutions like
longevity-linked life annuities (see, e.g., [10–12]), modern Tontines [13], or a
Tonnuity [14]. The different decumulation strategies aim to minimise longevity and
investment risks while optimising against a given objective function (maximise
consumption, maintain purchasing power of money, eliminate ruin chances, miti-
gating volatility in income streams, balance between guaranteed income sources
and liquid assets, bequest).
For decades, ensuring pension scheme members have saved enough for their
retirement was the main concern for employers and pension trustees. Yet, in recent
years, there is also growing interest in the payout phase of pensions. This is
explained by the fact that the nature of retirement is changing from a one-off
decision to a gradual transition with more flexible combinations between continued
labour income and pension benefits, by expanding retirement planning horizons
due to longevity increases, by the lack of traditional financial instruments like level
annuities, and by the number of available options at retirement which demand
financial knowledge. Trustees and employers are expected to meet the challenge of
preparing members for retirement and actively emphasise the members the advan-
tages of getting financial advice from a suitably qualified adviser if necessary.
The search for the appropriate decumulation option for accumulated individual
retirement savings has to take account of a number of particularities in individual
preferences and enabling environment, including differences in preferences for
annuities, income drawdowns of lump sum payments, including differences in
preferences for consumption and bequest, spouses’, and dependants’ benefits,
differences in the exposure to uninsurable risks/shocks that affect decumulation
(divorce, death of a partner and effects on wealth level, composition, service access,
financial crisis and effects on asset level/composition, health shocks, long-term
care), differences in access to financial market institutions and knowledge about
them, differences in socioeconomic characteristics, the utility effects of asset con-
servation, how individuals perceive and quantify their longevity risk exposure and
the existence of an efficient and affordable longevity insurance market [15].
In this chapter, we discuss and empirically investigate the welfare enhancing
characteristics of alternative annuities (e.g., participating longevity-linked life
annuities) and programmed withdrawal decumulation strategies, including simple
decision rule methods and actuarial methods. Maximising annuity income is one
important issue for many DC scheme members. Providing an efficient risk pooling
mechanism that addresses the (individual) uncertainty of death through the provi-
sion of a lifetime annuity is one of the main mechanisms pension schemes are
considered to redistribute income in a welfare-enhancing manner. Without such an
instrument, individuals risk outliving their accumulated (financial, housing, pen-
sion) wealth or leaving unintended bequests to his/her dependants. Traditional
(fixed, inflation-indexed) life annuities are a key instrument in mandated Defined
Benefit (DB) pension schemes, in financial (FDC) and non-financial Notional
Defined Contribution (NDC) schemes and in private pensions provided by insur-
ance companies.
Yet, contrary to standard Modigliani life-cycle model of savings and consump-
tion prediction, the voluntary market purchase of retirement annuities is in most
countries very limited and decreasing and the actual saving/dissaving behaviour
after retirement is often at odds with economic theory [16]. Several demand side
(e.g., perceived poor value-for-money, the existence of annuity alternatives,
bequest motives, behavioural and informational limitations, uncertainty regarding
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retirement income, shocks that prevent accumulation (e.g., unemployment spells
and scarring effects1), precautionary behaviour to face major family shocks) and
supply-side (e.g., the regulatory burden of annuity providers, with onerous capital
requirements for unhedgeable risks (e.g., longevity risk) within Solvency II, nearly
zero or negative interest rate environment and significant interest rate risk expo-
sure and lack of solutions to hedge against (see, e.g., [18]), long-term financial risk,
the cost of loss control and loss financing longevity risk management solutions, e.g.,
pension buy-ins, pension buy-outs, longevity bonds, longevity swaps, q-forwards,
S-forwards, longevity options, limited reinsurance capacity to absorb massive
exposure-to-risk and reduced risk appetite) arguments have been put forward to
explain this “annuity puzzle”, i.e., to explain why the level of annuitization by
individuals is much smaller than economic theory would suggest. This has increased
the attention towards new contract structures involving financial and longevity risk
sharing mechanisms between the annuity provider and annuitants, and increased
recommendations towards the use of deferred annuities, that reduce the cost of
guarantees and potentially augment their attractiveness to policyholders.
Common drawdown rules are typically derived from subjective judgements,
rules of thumb and simple assumptions, for instance, concerning the duration of the
payout phase. Simple drawdown rules like the 1/ex involve splitting the pension pot
into equal portions according to a fixed estimate of the life expectancy at age x, ex,
and disbursing one portion out to the retiree annually. The remaining funds are
invested in financial assets to ensure a stable income flow. Other rules like the “4%
rule” target to maintain the real value of the income flow while also maintaining an
account balance that keeps income flowing through retirement. Experts often name
this withdrawal rate a safe withdrawal rate (SWR) as the withdrawals will consist
primarily of interest and dividends but empirical studies confirm that the rule is
suboptimal and inefficient.
Instead of using simple heuristic rules of thumb, an alternative approach to
decumulation is to explicitly model consumers’ behaviour and objectives though an
objective function based on utility theory or cumulative prospect theory. The
objective function should account for preferences towards consumption level,
habits and smoothness, time, bequest, investment and longevity risks, health status,
and other characteristics. The value of the objective function is controlled by deci-
sion variables like the consumption rate or the asset allocation between alternative
asset classes including annuity-type structures. Retirement income outcomes can be
measured in many ways including absolute dollar amounts, income replacement
rates, or as a comparison to benchmark living standards. Several different utility
functions have been proposed in the academic literature to investigate
decumulation strategies and the optimality of dynamic, integrated consumption,
and investment decision problems. To compare the range of possible retirement
outcomes from competing decumulation designs, we provide some numerical
results on optimal consumption and investment strategies using Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation methods and a stochastic mortality and investment risk framework to model
biometric and financial market risks. The remaining of this chapter is organised as
follows. In Section 2, we analyse the pensioner’s retirement wallet portfolio compo-
sition. Section 3 highlights the key risk sources during the payout phase of pensions
and the menu of decumulation options available at retirement. Section 4 explains
the contact structure and valuation of innovative participating longevity-linked life
annuity contracts. Section 5 empirically investigates the welfare enhancing
1 See, e.g., [17] and references therein.
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characteristics of alternative pension decumulation strategies using Monte-Carlo
simulation methods. Section 6 concludes.
2. The retirement portfolio
The retirement wallet portfolio of pensioners potentially comprises public and
private pensions (state, linked to an employment relationship or occupational,
based on contracts between individuals and private pension or insurance life annu-
ity providers), private savings (dividends, coupon payments, cash withdrawals),
housing wealth, continued labour income, insurance, (narrow or extended) family,
and social institutions (Figure 1).
Public pension schemes (DB, DC, funded, or unfunded) typically provide a basic
retirement income, with different layers of pension generosity across countries
depending on the pension system structure and economic and financial system
development. Private pension plans financed through pension funds, pension
insurance contracts, book reserves, and bank or investment companies managed
funds are becoming more widespread, but there are still enormous differences in
the coverage and significance of private pension provisions across jurisdictions even
after accounting for the size of the population or domestic economy.2 However,
most DC scheme members have not contributed enough to receive even a modest
income stream in retirement. For the contrary, building up housing wealth through
homeownership and mortgage repayment is by far the main way European house-
holds set aside for old age [20]. In the Euro area countries, the household’s wealth
(excluding pension wealth) is primarily (82.2% of total assets) held in the form of
real assets, the largest component being the household main residence (HMR),
representing 60.2% of total real assets, with only 17.8% in the form of financial
Figure 1.
Funding for longer lives: the retirement wallet. Source: Author’s elaboration based on [6].
2 For example, pension funds held assets worth less than 1% of GDP in France or Greece while they held
171% of GDP in the Netherlands, 150.8% in Iceland or 132.6% in Australia.
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assets (Figure 2). In the EU, roughly 70% of Europeans live in owner-occupied
accommodation, ownership is higher in poorer countries and the proportion of
homeowners by age band has been steadily increasing with each successive genera-
tion. Empirical evidence also shows that homeowners are generally wealthier than
their non-home owning counterparts, and this conclusion is valid across the income
or net wealth distribution and across countries [19].
If retirees wish to assume responsibility for their welfare needs at retirement,
private pensions and private homeownership are the two main assets available to
finance them. The two options involve long-term saving and investment decisions
over the life cycle, both are motivated by potentially competing and conflicting
objectives, but they tend to deliver different outcomes and options in the
decumulation phase of pensions [6]. Home homeownership provides a stream of
housing services starting at time of house acquisition and represents wealth which
could be cashed in later in life, if needed. The asset serves both consumption and
investment functions, which are assessed differently by households according to
their personal preferences, for example, bequest motives. The main difficulty is
currently managing and accessing housing wealth in an efficient way to supplement
retirement income. In theory, there is a catalogue of Equity Release Mechanisms
(ERS) available to individuals, including contract structures which allow individ-
uals to sell and continue to live in their home (e.g., home reversion schemes), others
that involve selling and moving (e.g., rent, downsizing, moving to a third-party
home), and in situ mortgage ERS, for instance, reverse mortgages (Figure 3). Other
design features include the time of equity release, the ownership of the property, or
the amount of equity that can be potentially released.3
The family will continue to play an important role in the retirement wallet
portfolio in most countries and regions, particularly in the form of services and
Figure 2.
Decomposition of real assets by asset category, euro area. Source: Own composition based on household finance
and consumption survey, 2nd wave [20]. Notes: Shares of real assets types on total real assets by euro-area
country. The HFCS classifies real assets into five categories: The HMR, other real estate property, vehicles,
valuables (valuable jewellery, antiques, or art), and self-employment businesses.
3 See [19] for a detailed analysis of ERS schemes.
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care, although family support is likely to be less relevant in the future due to smaller
family sizes, fewer children to provide care, changing family composition, higher
children’s mobility, and increasing female labour market participation. Support
from local/municipal social institutions (e.g., retirement communities) also has an
important role in retirement, especially for low-income groups. Insurance mecha-
nisms must play an increasing role in the retirement wallet portfolio of retirees since
some of the most important risks individuals face during retirement (e.g., longevity
risk, health-care risk, long-term care risk, investment risk, inflation risk) are insur-
able risks and traditional and innovative solutions have been developing to address
them in a cost-efficient manner [15]. Contrary to traditional models of labour
supply, empirical evidence suggests that the share of labour income from continued
work after statutory retirement age is increasing and the trend is persistent.
The build-up, management, and decumulation of the retirement wallet portfolio
are different between individuals and are not guaranteed to be optimal as predicted
by the lifecycle hypothesis. This is because uncertainty regarding retirement
income, the existence shocks that prevent accumulation (e.g., unemployment spells
and scarring effects)4, precautionary saving preventing major family shocks (e.g.,
death of a spouse, divorce), uninsured future health care and long-term expendi-
tures, intended bequests, behavioural and cultural biases, outdated social norms and
Figure 3.
Typology of equity release mechanisms. Source: Own composition based on [19, 21–23] with author’s additions.
4 See, e.g., [17] and references therein.
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psychological barriers, mental-accounting, the design and implementation of man-
dated earnings-related retirement schemes across countries including minimum
income and service guarantees, pensions taxation regimes that penalise accumulat-
ing or decumulation, low risk appetite and financial literacy, and the heterogeneity
in longevity by income levels [5, 16].
3. The decumulation menu of pensions
The decumulation or payout phase of pensions is the process of converting the
retirement portfolio into a regular flow of income and services. Decumulation
requires individuals to decide upon a retirement strategy, comprising a longevity
insurance strategy determining the provisions taken by individuals to protect
against longevity risk, that is, to guarantee they do not outlive their retirement
portfolio, a withdrawal strategy, stipulating how much to withdraw from the
retirement pot to finance regular consumption expenditures, an investment strat-
egy determining how to maximise the portfolio’s return considering one’s risk
profile5, and efficient and effective administration.
The key risk sources during decumulation include individual and aggregate
longevity, investment, health, liquidity, inflation, retirement timing, bequest,
annuitization, life shocks, taxation, political and regulatory interventions, market
conduct, and credit risk (Table 1). Individuals can manage these risks through, for
instance, intra-generational risk pooling mechanisms (e.g., insurance), inter-
generational risk sharing vehicles (e.g., pension schemes), proper hedging instru-
ments, risk mitigation and diversification strategies, default investment options,
financial education, and effective regulation.
Typical retirement income goals include: (i) maximising the expected retirement
income and consumption over one’s lifetime; (ii) consumption smoothing,
(iii) generate a lifetime retirement income that cannot be outlived, (iv) preserving
the ability to bequest unused wealth, (v) liquidity concerns in case of unforeseen
expenses (e.g., long-term care), (vi) protecting against common financial and bio-
metric risks (e.g., longevity, inflation, investment, life events, fraud), (vii) pre-
serving the purchasing power of income, (viii) preserving the chance to profit from
upward trends in financial markets, and (ix) keeping the investment strategy sim-
ple. The main options available for decumulating retirement assets accumulated in
DC pension plans include lump sum payments, programmed or phased with-
drawals, life annuities, and hybrid solutions.
The possibility of taking accumulated financial savings as a cash lump sum is
typically dependent both on the contractual arrangements defined by the pension
plan and the tax rules in force in a particular jurisdiction. Lump sum payments offer
retirees full flexibility in the use of accumulated savings, including spending on
leisure activities, passing on part of their retirement pot to children or other family
members, investing in new or additional property, paying off a mortgage on a house
or other debts, continuing to pursue an investment strategy, and the ability to “self-
annuitize” at a time and on a basis that best suits their financial needs, but also
embodies important shortcomings, particularly the lack of protection against (indi-
vidual and aggregate) longevity risk, and against investment, credit, and inflation
risks [7].
5 Note that the benchmark for assessing the investment performance is not in this case in terms of an
asset benchmark but in terms of a given liability cash flow stream (consumption expenditures), i.e., this
is a liability-driven investing (LDI) strategy (see, e.g., [18, 24–27]).
8
Who Wants to Retire and Who Can Afford to Retire
Programmed withdrawal arrangements allow retirees to cash in periodically from
their retirement portfolio to cover necessary expenses, allowing individuals to pre-
serve control and ownership over their assets, to decide upon the desired investment
strategy, but do encompass biometrical risk-pooling that protects, for example,
against longevity risk. The regular income flows may be the result of an explicit
withdrawal rule or plan (e.g., the so-called 4% sustainable withdrawal rule, a fraction
of the remaining life expectancy at the retirement age, possibly with lower and upper
bounds, a constant amount) or simply be the result of discretionary actions.6
Risk Definition
Individual longevity Risk of outliving the retirement pot or experiencing a substantial reduction in
retirement income
Aggregate longevity Risk that overall population lives longer than anticipated forcing, e.g., a
reduction in public pension benefits
Investment The risk that portfolio investment performance mismatches the desired pattern
of consumption in retirement
Inflation The risk that a generalised rise in prices erodes the purchasing power of
pensions benefits and other retirement income
Health/dependency Risk that a deteriorating health condition significantly increases health-care o
long-term care expenditures
Liquidity Risk arising from the lack of marketability of retirement assets
Retirement timing
risk
Uncertainty about when the scheme member will retire from labour market
and/or begin to make withdrawals
Bequest Most parents have an altruistic approach to life and care about their closest
relatives, and try to leave them the household’s main residence, cash, or her
financial and real assets
Annuitization Mandatory annuitization may take place at a point where interest rates are
lower than anticipated
Political and
regulatory
The risk that either public of private pension system providers may be forced
to reduce their pension payments, because pension systems are financially
unsustainable or as a result of a political decision and the risk that regulations
change in an adverse way
Taxes Risk that a variation in the regulatory or tax environment will reduce the
disposable retirement income, e.g., an increase in income tax rates or
deductions, an increase in VAT taxes, an increase in capital market taxes
Life events Divorce, death of spouse/partner, etc
Behavioural Risk that pensioners behave in a way that is not considered to be rational,
incapacity to make an ‘informed choice’ due to insufficient financial literacy
and understanding of risks
Market conduct and
credit risk
The risk that financial and non-financial service providers act in a way that
disadvantages retirees and credit risk referring to the events after which
companies or individuals will be unable to make the required payments on
their debt or contract obligations
Source: Author’s elaboration based on [6, 7, 28].
Table 1.
Key risk sources during the payout phase of pensions.
6 Although self-managed products are available, normally retirement withdrawal products are delegated
management retirement products under which the account management activities are allocated to the
asset management company.
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The fixed percentage, the constant (inflation-adjusted), and the floor-
and-ceiling withdrawals rules were introduced by [29, 30]. The first spending rule
considers fixed-percentage withdrawals (users spend a constant percentage of their
assets in each year of retirement) and the second one considers an annual adjust-
ment for inflation. The third method considers establishes a floor and a ceiling to
cash withdrawals. According to [31, 32], this strategy allows greater spending
when markets do well and spending reductions when markets do poorly. The
target Percentage Adjustment rule was introduced in [33] and defines whether
spending adjusts for inflation given a fixed-return assumption and a 45-year
time horizon.
Programmed withdrawal has some advantages compared with annuity
purchase (e.g., higher liquidity and flexibility to respond to unexpected consump-
tion expenditures, retaining control over retirement assets, potentially higher pay-
outs due to enhanced investment returns, possibility to allocate assets to inflation-
linked investments, compatibility with the bequest motive, death benefit
options), but also several drawbacks, particularly the lack of protection against
longevity risk, no mortality cross subsidy, and significant exposure to
investment risk [6].
The classical payout option for generating a predictable income stream in retire-
ment is a life annuity. Annuity products offer protection against individual and
aggregate longevity risk, a mortality cross subsidy from pooling risks but imply the
loss of control over assets and no flexibility to address unexpected expenditures or
the bequest motive. There are many types of annuities that can be differentiated,
for instance, by the nature of payment, by the number of people covered, by the
duration of payments, by the time that payouts commence, by the frequency of
premium payments, by the distribution channel and types of options included,
among other features (Figure 4). Recent developments in this area include partic-
ipating longevity-linked life annuities in which annuitants share both investment
Figure 4.
Types of life annuities. Source: Author’s elaboration based on [6, 7].
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and longevity risk but profit from risk-pooling [11, 12, 34], variable annuities7,
modern Tontines [13], and Tonnuity [14].
According to [35–37], a deferred annuity is suitable for risk-averse individuals,
because it insures against increases in annuity prices and provides a smooth income.
The group self-annuitization scheme (GSA) proposed by [39, 40] was analysed in
[38] where pool participants are insured against individual longevity risk and share
systematic mortality and longevity risks. They put forward that the GSA can
outperform inflation-linked annuities when there are loadings. When individuals
have a bequest motive, portfolios with phased withdrawals improve individuals’
welfare. Their results follow previous literature which suggests that individuals
should not fully annuitize their wealth but hold an equity portfolio and match their
consumption expenditures with regular cash withdrawals.
4. Sharing investment and longevity risk: participating longevity-linked
life annuities
Contrary to standard life-cycle theory, the voluntary market purchase of retire-
ment annuities is very limited and decreasing in most countries and the actual
saving/dissaving behaviour after retirement is often at odds with economic theory
[16]. A number of demand side (e.g., perceived poor value-for-money, the exis-
tence of annuity alternatives, bequest motives, behavioural and informational lim-
itations) and supply-side (e.g., the regulatory burden of annuity providers) with
onerous capital requirements for unhedgeable risks (e.g., longevity risk) within
Solvency II, nearly zero interest rate environment and significant interest rate risk
exposure, long-term financial risk, the cost of loss control and loss financing lon-
gevity risk management solutions, limited reinsurance capacity to absorb massive
exposure-to-risk) arguments have been put forward to explain this “annuity puz-
zle”, that is, to explain why the level of annuitization by individuals is much
smaller than economic theory would suggest [6, 41, 42]. Several index-type and
indemnity-type mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to directly or
indirectly share financial and longevity risks between annuity providers and
individuals [10, 11, 43].
Participating longevity-linked life annuities (PLLAs) are life insurance contracts
in which benefits are updated periodically based on the dynamics of both a longev-
ity index, defined as the ratio between the expected survival probability and the
survival rate observed in a reference population, and of an interest rate adjustment
factor, defined as the ratio between observed and guaranteed financial returns
7 Variable annuities can adopt different forms. Annuity benefits can rise (or fall) at a prescribed fixed
nominal rate that escalates with the age of the annuitant (escalating annuity); they can be indexed to
inflation, thus providing a guaranteed income in real terms (inflation linked or real annuity); they can be
linked to observed survival probability (longevity-linked life annuity); they can depend on the insurance
company’s surplus (participating or with profit annuity); or even reflect the performance of an
underlying investment portfolio, usually represented by a family of mutual funds (investment-linked or
variable annuity). In some annuities, pay-outs can also participate in mortality risk. The most common
guarantees embedded in variable annuities are: (i) guaranteed minimum death benefit (GMDB); (ii)
guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMIB); (iii) guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (GMWB);
(iv) guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit (GLWB); (v) guaranteed minimum accumulation benefit
(GMAB).
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[10, 11].8 In this section, we briefly describe the benefit structure and risk sharing
design of immediate PLLAs. We then introduce the valuation setup via embedded
longevity option decomposition.
Consider an index-type participating longevity-linked life annuity (PLLA) along
the lines proposed by [11, 12]. Under this arrangement, the annuity benefit is
periodically updated according to both the observed survival experience of a refer-
ence pool and the investment performance of the financial assets backing the
contract. Without loss of generality, let us assume a single cohort product in which
annuitants contribute equal amounts into the annuity fund and, in return, receive
equal annuity benefit payments bt at time t. Under this contract, the annual benefit
at some future date t0 þ k, bt0þk, will depart from the initial benefit, bt0 , according
to the dynamics of both a longevity It0þk and an interest rate adjustment (IRA) Rt0þk
factors as follows:
bt0þk ¼ bt0  It0þk  Rt0þk, k ¼ 1, … ,ω x (1)
where It0þk is a ratio between the expected survival probability and the survival
rate observed in a reference population, defined by
It0þk ¼
kp
F0½ 
x0
t0ð Þ
kp
Fk½ 
x0 tkð Þ
¼
Yk1
j¼0
p
F0½ 
x0þj
t0 þ jð Þ
p
Fk½ 
x0þj
t0 þ jð Þ
(2)
with
kp
F0½ 
x0þj
t0 þ jð Þ ¼
Yk1
j¼0
1 qx0þj t0 þ jð Þ
h i
(3)
denoting the k-year survival probability of some reference population cohort
aged x0 at time t0 (computed at contract inception on a market or national popula-
tion life table) and kp
Fk½ 
x0
tkð Þ is the corresponding k-year survival probability
observed at time and the highest attainable age. In Eq. (3), qx0þj t0 þ jð Þ is the
1-year death probability of an individual aged x0 + j at time t0 + j. The IRA factor
Rt0þk is defined by
Rt0þk ¼
Qk1
j¼0 1þ Rtð Þ
1þ it0ð Þ
k
(4)
where Rt denotes the observed net investment return in year t and it0 is the
(generally non-negative) guaranteed minimum interest rate set at time 0.
If investment and mortality improvements are as expected, the arrangement
resembles a classical nominal fixed life annuity. If Rt = it0 and observed longevity
improvements are higher (lower) than predicted, that is, It0þk < 1 It0þk > 1ð Þ ∀ k,
annuity payments will decline (increase) along with the dynamics of It0þk. If mor-
tality improvements are as expected and investments perform above the guaranteed
interest rate, the extra return is returned to participants in the form of a higher
benefit payment. This risk-sharing nature of this contract contrasts with classical
8 A related approach is found in [34] in which annuity payments are updated only if observed
survivorship rates exceed a given threshold.
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fixed annuities in which all risks (financial and biometric) are transferred to the
annuity provider. Benefit volatility may be mitigated by introducing bounds to the
longevity and IRA adjustment factors (or to the benefit amount).
The valuation of a PLLA at time t0 can be obtained via longevity option decom-
position (see [11] for details), that is, by decomposing the PLLA into a long position
in a fixed annuity a F0½ x0 t0ð Þ and a short position in an embedded European-style
longevity floor LF0 t0ð Þ with underlying It0þk, constant strike equal to one unit of
currency and maturity ω – x0,
aPLLAx0 t0ð Þ ¼ a
F0½ 
x0
t0ð Þ  L
F t0ð Þ (5)
with
LF t0ð Þ ¼
Xωx0
k¼1
EQ B 0, kð Þ  kp
F0½ 
x0
t0Þ  1 It0þkð Þ
þ
F  (6)
where B(t,T) is the interest rate discount factor, a+: = max(a, 0) and, without
loss of generality, we consider an immediate PLLA contract with initial benefit
bt0 ¼ 1 and a scenario in which observed longevity improvements are higher than
predicted and investment performance matches the guaranteed interest rate.
5. On the welfare of pension decumulation strategies
In this section, we empirically investigate the welfare enhancing characteristics
of alternative pension decumulation strategies. Specifically, we test eight alternative
strategies tested:
i. A fixed withdrawal rule based on life expectancy observed at age in the
retirement year t0, that is, a 1=ex,t0 rule
ii. A fixed withdrawal rule based on the life annuity factor estimated at age in
the retirement year t0, 1=ax,t0 , with no annuitization
iii. A withdrawal rule based on life expectancy observed at age x in year t, 1=ex,t
iv. The “4%” SWR rule
v. Buying a PLLA at retirement age
vi. Buying a classical single premium nominal life annuity (SPLA) at retirement
age
vii. Investing 80% of the initial wealth in the “4%” SWR rule and the remaining
20% in a ALDA
viii.Buying an Inflation-Protected Annuity (IPA) at retirement age
The welfare analysis considers a time-separable utility function including life-
time consumption and bequest motives [44]. We assume individuals want to max-
imise the expected present value of utility derived from consumption through their
remaining lifetime,
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Ut ¼ max c1,c1,… ,cTEt
Xωx0
k¼1
βt kp
F0½ 
x0
u ctð Þþt1q
F0½ 
x0
γ W tð Þ
n o" #
(7)
with
u ctð Þ ¼
c1ρt
1 ρ
, ct ≥0 (8)
and
γ W tð Þ ¼
φ
1 φ
  ρ φ1φ cb þW t 1ρ
1 ρ
,W t ≥0 (9)
where β is the subjective utility discount factor, ρ > 0 the level of risk aversion,
cb measures the degree to which bequests are considered as luxury goods, φ[0,1)
measures the strength of the member’s bequest motive when bequest has kicked in
(i.e., when Wt > cb).
The utility function expresses the preferences of individuals by assigning higher
values on favourable outcomes (higher consumption and bequest) while marking
down poor outcomes such as a consistently lower level of retirement income. The
utility function separately considers the risk aversion over consumption and
bequest, allowing for subjective adjustments to how the individuals value different
retirement outcomes. The dynamics of wealth is
W tþ1 ¼ W t  ct þ Ptð Þ 1þ Rtþ1ð Þ, (10)
where Rt + 1 is the stochastic (post-tax) rate of return.
To compare the performance of alternative decumulation strategies, we com-
pute a utility score, S0, defined as the constant level of income which delivers an
equivalent level of expected utility to that delivered by each strategy,
S0 ¼ U0 
1 ρPωx0
k¼1 β
t
kp
F0½ 
x0 þt1q
F0½ 
x0 þ
φ
1φ
 n o 
2
4
3
5
1
1ρ
, (11)
The valuation framework comprises a risk-neutral, frictionless and continuous
financial market in which the annuity provider invests the insurance premium in a
portfolio of dividend-paying stocks (30%) and coupon bonds (70%), and a risk-free
interest rate. We assume the yield curve dynamics is well captured by a two-factor
equilibrium model [45] and the stock market index follows a standard geometric
Brownian motion diffusion process.
To account for the longevity risk premium in pricing the contracts, we compute
cohort-specific risk-adjusted survival probabilities by using a risk-neutral simulation
approach assuming the dynamics of mortality rates is well represented by the log
bilinear Lee-Carter model under a Poisson setting, with time trend parameter
modelled using a general ARIMA(p,d,q) model and risk neutral distribution of the
innovations obtained using the Wang transform. The results are generated through
10,000 independent sample paths for both the survival probability of a cohort aged x
in at time 0 and the portfolio returns. We calibrate the models to historical (monthly)
data on US 3-month and 10-year maturity bond yields from January 1, 2010 to
September 1, 2019 and to US mortality data from 1960 to 2016 obtained from the
human mortality database [46]. The baseline parameters are given in Table 2.
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Figure 5 plots the dynamics of consumption over time for the eight strategies
tested. Except for level fixed SPIA annuities that payoff a constant nominal benefit
for life, all other strategies experience some benefit volatility and different trends.
Inflation-protected annuities guarantee constant real benefits, which means nominal
steadily increase with inflation over time. The 4% SWR rule generates increasing
consumption over time but only up to some point, when the portfolio value is
exhausted and consumption levels must be reduced. When combined with the
acquisition of an ALDA annuity, the 4% delivers increasing and sustainable
Parameter Value Notes
Subjective utility discount factor: β 0.975
Risk aversion coefficient: ρ 5
Strength of bequest motive: φ 0.83
Bequests as luxury goods level: cb 25.8 10
3 USD
Initial wealth (1000 s): W0 210 10
3 USD
Tax rate: s 20%
ALDA deferment period: k 20 years
Pension benefits: Pt 0
Life annuity loading 10%
PLLA bounds (80%; 120%)
Number of simulations 1000
Investment horizon 35 years
Guaranteed annuity interest rate (GIR) 1%
Minimum consumption level 6 103 USD
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Table 2.
Baseline parameters.
Figure 5.
Dynamics of consumption level by decumulation strategy. Source: Author’s elaboration.
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consumption levels and longevity insurance. The dynamic life expectancy strategy
generates consumption levels that cannot be sustained over time, quickly converging
towards deprivation and personal bankruptcy. The PLLA structure with 20% maxi-
mum benefit volatility pays higher benefits compared with a classic SPIA annuity or
self-annuitization strategies and offers longevity insurance for life, but at the expense
of additional benefit volatility.
Figure 6 plots the wealth dynamics by decumulation strategy over a 35-year
period. For strategies involving full annuitization, the remaining wealth is, by
definition, zero since all assets are used to pay for the insurance premium. For the
remaining, the dynamics of the asset portfolio depends on regular consumption
levels and portfolio annual returns. We can observe that for all strategies the
portfolio value reduces with time, in some cases until its complete exhaustion (e.g.,
1/ex,t strategy).
We can observe also that the classical 4% SWR rule is not sustainable for long
planning horizons, contrary to the conservative static life expectancy strategy
1/ex,0 that delivers significant bequest utility. When combined with advanced age
longevity insurance, the strategy is likely to improve individuals’welfare when they
have a bequest motive since additional portfolio value is preserved. Ceteris paribus,
the higher the wealth level at death (if positive), the higher the utility from leaving
values in the residual benefit. Individuals pursuing a self-annuitization strategy
1/ax,t are also likely to guarantee an inheritance to their heirs.
Table 3 provides illustrative simulation-based welfare results for the
decumulation strategies tested in this study in which individuals are exposed to
market and longevity risk. The results include the mean consumption and wealth
levels over the planning horizon and the asset balance at age 100, consumption
volatility (standard deviation), expected utility computed using Eq. (7) and utility
score values.9
We can observe that the decumulation strategy involving purchasing a partici-
pating longevity-linked annuity at retirement age provides the highest utility score,
Figure 6.
Wealth dynamics by decumulation strategy. Source: Author’s elaboration.
9 Detailed results can be obtained from the author upon request.
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that is, the highest (certain equivalent) constant level of income (considering the
trade-off against residual benefit) which delivers an equivalent level of expected
utility. The self-annuitization decumulation strategy comes second in terms of
utility score, followed by classical SPIA annuity purchase. The good performance of
the PLLA strategy is explained essentially by the higher consumption levels it
delivers in early retirement years which are less discounted (actuarily and
intertemporally) by individuals since, by construction, the strategy offers no utility
from bequest. The strategy provides longevity risk insurance and relatively low
consumption volatility when compared with most alternatives.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, we review and discuss the main pension decumulation options
by explicitly modelling consumers’ behaviour and objectives though an objective
function based on utility theory accounting for consumption and bequest motives
and different risk preferences. We conclude that purchasing a capped participating
longevity-linked life annuity at retirement including embedded longevity and
financial options that allow the annuity provider to periodically revise annuity
payments if observed survivorship and portfolio outcomes deviate from expected
(or guaranteed) values as contract initiation deliver superior welfare results when
compared with classical annuitization and non-annuitization decumulation strate-
gies. Contrary to standard fixed annuities in which the insurer bears all risk, PLLAs
offer an efficient and transparent way of sharing biometric and financial market
risks between annuity providers and policyholders. They are an interesting and
promising product for the payout phase of pension schemes since the contract
tackles some of the demand- and supply-side constraints that prevent individuals
from annuitizing their retirement wealth and may contribute to help insurers writ-
ing new annuity policies. By linking the annuity benefit to the survival experience
of a given underlying population and to the performance of the asset portfolio
backing the contract PLLAs provide a direct mechanism to share financial and
longevity risk and are an interesting alternative to manage systematic longevity
risk in markets in which alternative risk management solutions (longevity-
linked securities, reinsurance arrangements, capital allocation) are scarce and/or
expensive.
Metric Strategy
1/ex,0 1/axe,0 1/ex,t 4% rule PLLA SPLA 4% + ALDA IPA
Mean Ct 9.38 8.77 6.98 9.06 12.53 10.90 14.57 22.24
Ct stdev 2.43 4.13 7.19 8.23 1.30 0.00 6.80 11.92
Mean Wt 180,98 129.72 68.62 112.77 0.00 0.00 150.22 0.00
Wt (age
100)
162.70 90.18 0.00 37.54 0.00 0.00 163.54 0.00
E(Ut) 4.0 263,7 744.078 318.4 0.00012 0.00025 0.00071 0.00043
S0 11.29 11.78 9.29 10.47 13.69 11.45 8.82 9.99
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: Market price of longevity risk set by λ = 0.3 (Wang Transform parameter).
Table 3.
Simulation-based welfare results: baseline scenario.
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